Introduction
Much excitement was caused when it was discovered in 1986 by Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson that all statements in NP have computational zero-knowledge interactive proof{systems (under the assumption that secure encryption functions exist) GMW]. See also BC1]. Such proof{systems, a notion formalized by Goldwasser, Micali and Racko a few years previously, allow an in nitely powerful (but not trusted) prover to convince a probabilistic polynomial-time veri er of the validity of a statement in a way that does not convey any polynomial-time-usable knowledge to the veri er, other than the validity of the statement GMR]. Informally, this means that the veri er should not be able to generate anything in probabilistic polynomial time after having participated in the protocol, that he could not have generated by himself without ever talking to the prover (from mere belief that the statement is true). We say of such proof{systems that they are statistically convincing because the veri er is convinced by overwhelming statistical evidence: no matter how she 1 proceeds, the prover is almost certain to be caught cheating if she tries to convince the veri er of a false statement. A more precise de nition (not needed for this paper) can be found in GMR].
A result similar to those of GMW, BC1] was obtained independently by Chaum, but under a very di erent model, which emphasizes the unconditional privacy of the prover's secret information, even if the veri er has unlimited computing power Ch]. Independently, Brassard and Cr epeau considered a model (compatible with Chaum's) in which all parties involved are assumed to have reasonable computing power, and they also obtained a protocol unconditionally secure for the prover (meaning that the prover's safety did not depend on unproved cryptographic assumptions) BC2]. On the other hand, these protocols are not statistically convincing (hence they are not proof{systems in the terminology of GMR]) because the prover could cheat without fear of detection if she had unlimited computing power or, more importantly in practice, if she could break an unproved cryptographic assumption in real-time. For this reason, we say of these protocols that they are computationally convincing. (Such protocols have also been termed arguments BC3] in order to distinguish them from proof{systems; Goldreich has proposed calling them computationally{sound proofs; we follow here a terminology recently proposed by Chaum.) The di erence between these results is important because all the information on the prover's secret is given to the veri er in the protocols of GMW, BC1], albeit in enciphered form. Hence, the veri er can have access to the prover's secret information, provided he can break the cryptographic assumption | perhaps by luck | or if he is willing to undergo an infeasible computation. Such attacks from the veri er can even be performed o -line, i.e. any time after the protocol has been completed. In contrast, no information at all (even in the sense of Shannon's information theory S] ) is given to the veri er in the protocols of Ch, BC2], except with an exponentially small probability. This exponentially small probability of cheating for the veri er was subsequently removed by Brassard, Chaum and Cr epeau BCC], thanks to an 1 It is convenient to give distinct and de nite genders to the participants of our protocols. The prover will be referred to as a \she" (think of P as Peggy) and the veri er will be referred to as a \he" (V as Vic). Other actors to be introduced later are the simulator (Section ??), referred to as an \it", and the originator and the receiver in bit commitment schemes (Section ??). The case of the latter two is more complex because the originator's role is usually played by the prover but sometimes by the veri er. Out of context, the originator will be a \she" and the receiver will be a \he", but this will switch when the originator is de nitely the veri er. idea of Damg ard CDG] (and independently of Boyar, Krentel and Kurtz BKK] ), yielding in e ect a perfect zero-knowledge protocol in the terminology of GMW]. This implies that the prover's safety would still be guaranteed inde nitely, even if strong organizations with unknown computing power and algorithmic knowledge were to try to extract her secret. Thus, the crucial di erence between computational and perfect zero-knowledge is that in the former case the veri er may obtain information on the prover's secret through the interaction, but he cannot make use of it in polynomial time (unless the cryptographic assumption fails), whereas in the latter case, the veri er obtains no information whatsoever on the prover's secret (beyond its existence and the fact that the prover knows it). To summarize, GMW, BC1] give computational zero-knowledge statistically convincing interactive protocols, whereas BCC] gives a perfect zero-knowledge computationally convincing interactive protocol.
What about the best of both worlds? Unfortunately, Fortnow proved that is in unlikely that there is a free lunch F] : the prover's increased safety in Ch, BC2, BCC] inevitably requires that an in nitely powerful prover (in fact exponentially powerful would su ce) could cheat the veri er (unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses). This is why a perfect zero-knowledge statistically convincing interactive protocol is unlikely to exist for NP{complete problems, even under a reasonable cryptographic assumption.
The main motivation behind the work of GMW, BC1, Ch, BC2, BCC] was a quest for generality: what are the most general statements that can be handled by (perfect) zero-knowledge interactive protocols if little attention is paid to eciency? Other researchers were willing to sacri ce generality on the altar of eciency. The best known instance of this approach is Feige, Fiat and Shamir's identi cation system FFS] , which handles an ad hoc problem relevant to the purpose of identi cation, but was not designed to handle statements about NP{complete problems. One reason why the FFS scheme is so attractive in practice is that it requires only a few rounds of communication between the prover and the veri er. A constant-round perfect zero-knowledge statistically convincing interactive protocol was also known for the speci c problem of graph non-isomorphism, due to Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson GMW] . In sharp contrast, the more general protocols of GMW, BC1, Ch, BC2, BCC] require an arbitrarily high number of rounds in order to achieve an arbitrarily high level of con dence. This paper addresses the fol-lowing question: Is it possible to combine generality and arbitrarily high con dence with a constant number of rounds? Provided that one-way certi ed group actions exist (see Section ??), our answer is that any NP statement can be handled by a three-round perfect zero-knowledge computationally convincing interactive protocol. (By one \round", we mean two \moves": one message sent by the veri er followed by one message sent by the prover.) Similar questions have been investigated by other researchers. Goldreich and Kahn GKa], and independently Naor and Yung NY] have developed constantround computational zero-knowledge statistically convincing interactive protocols for all NP statements. In contrast, we describe here the rst constant-round perfect zero-knowledge interactive protocol, which is of course merely computationally convincing. Our work was rst presented at the 16th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming (Icalp), held in July 1989 BCY]. Shortly thereafter, Feige and Shamir introduced an entirely di erent solution to the same problem at the Crypto '89 conference, held in August 1989 FS] . Most of Feige and Shamir's work deals with a computationally convincing interactive protocol that is merely computational zero-knowledge under the very weak assumption that one-way functions exist, but they also show how to make it perfect zero-knowledge under a stronger assumption essentially identical to the one we need here.
Further developments are also worth mentioning. After reading our Icalp paper BCY], Bellare, Micali and Ostrovsky discovered a beautiful constant-round perfect zero-knowledge statistically convincing interactive protocol for graph isomorphism and, more generally, for any random self-reducible problem BMO]. Their protocol does not depend on any unproved assumptions. They achieved this by building upon our technique, and adding several very clever ideas, in particular in the design of their simulator. Of course, because of Fortnow's result, their protocol cannot be extended to NP{complete problems unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses.
Sequential versus parallel templates
More precise de nitions of what exactly is a perfect zero-knowledge computationally convincing interactive protocol are given in Section ??, just before we describe our nal protocol and prove that it is correct. In the mean time, we believe that it is preferable to keep the discussion at a more intuitive level.
The protocols of GMW, BC1, Ch, BC2, BCC] all follow the same basic template, which we shall refer to as the sequential approach. Very abstractly, it is illustrated as Protocol 1 below. Here, k is a con dence parameter that must be agreed upon in advance between the prover and the veri er (perhaps during the initialization step).
Protocol 1 ( the sequential approach ) 1: perhaps some initialization 2: for i 1 to k do The prover commits herself by sending x i to the veri er The veri er sends challenge y i to the prover The prover meets the challenge by sending z i to the veri er.
Each time round the loop, the prover places herself in a situation in which several challenges (2 in BC1, Ch, BC2, BCC], many in GMW]) could be issued by the veri er. This is done in a way that the prover can meet all of these challenges if and only if she is honest in her claim, but meeting any speci c one of them yields worthless information to the veri er. Because the prover is required to meet only one challenge in each round, and because each round is independent from the others, the veri er learns nothing about her secret. Because the prover cannot predict ahead of time which challenge will be issued, the veri er's con dence in the prover's claim increases exponentially with the number of rounds.
In order to reduce the number of rounds to a constant, Protocol 2 comes immediately to mind. We shall refer to it as the parallel approach.
Protocol 2 ( the parallel approach ) 1: perhaps some initialization 2: The prover commits herself by sending x 1 ; x 2 ; . . .; x k to the veri er 3: The veri er sends challenges y 1 ; y 2 ; . . .; y k to the prover 4: The prover meets the challenges by sending z 1 ; z 2 ; . . .; z k to the veri er.
It is easy to prove that the parallel approach cannot help the prover cheat. At rst, it seems equally certain that if the veri er could not squeeze additional knowledge out of the sequential protocol, running the protocol in parallel cannot possibly help him to do so. However, nothing is certain in this world except death and taxes, and indeed this intuition is false (as pointed out in GMW] in relation with their protocol for graph isomorphism). This is because the parallel approach makes it possible for the veri er to choose each challenge as a function of the entire set of prover's commitments. This may seem harmless, but there are exponentially many possible challenge vectors. If this choice of challenges is made according to a one-way hash function, it makes it possible for the veri er to obtain information (the transcript of his conversation with the prover) that he could apparently not have obtained e ciently without access to the prover (or to someone in possession of her secret information). Goldreich and Krawczyk have indeed recently proved that the direct parallelization of the GMW] protocol for graph isomorphism is not perfect zero-knowledge if the veri er is allowed to be non-uniform whereas the simulator (see Section ??) is restricted to being black-box GKr]. Whether this could in some cases help the veri er compute the prover's secret is a most interesting open question.
Bit commitment schemes
Central to our parallel protocol for any NP-statement is the notion of trap-door bit commitment scheme, which was rst introduced in BCC] under the more poetic name of chameleon blobs. The phrase \trap-door bit commitment scheme" was coined by Shamir FS] after reading BCC]. We prefer it because it is more selfexplanatory.
The purpose of a bit commitment scheme (not necessarily trap-door) is to allow one party, the originator, to commit to the value of a bit in a way that prevents the other party, the receiver, from learning it without the rst party's help, but also in a way that prevents the rst party from changing its value. At any time after she has committed to a bit, the originator can show the receiver which bit she had committed to, a process known as opening the bit commitment. Of course, she should not be able to cheat by \changing her mind", i.e. showing the wrong bit. In most zero-knowledge interactive protocols, the originator is the prover, but we shall see that this is not necessarily so.
Bit commitment schemes can be implemented in a great many ways BCC]. When they are based on cryptography and computational complexity (rather than physical envelopes or other devices such as quantum blobs BB2]), they are necessarily imperfect. This imperfection can happen in two very di erent ways. If it is impossible for the originator to change her commitments in the receiver's back, then it can be at best infeasible (i.e. within a reasonable amount of time) for the receiver to determine the bits committed to without the originator's help. Conversely, if it is impossible for the receiver to determine these bits, then it can be at best infeasible for the originator to change her mind about a bit she had committed to when (and if) In order to set up the bit commitment scheme, the originator and receiver initially agree on a large prime p for which they both know the factorization of p ? 1 ( nding large primes p with known factorization of p ? 1 can be done e ciently in practice M]). They also agree on a generator of Z p . Thanks to their knowledge of the factors of p ? 1, they can both verify with certainty that p is a prime and that is a generator of Z p . Moreover, the density of generators is high enough that one can be found reasonably e ciently by random trial and error. Actually, the parameters p and need not be changed each time a bit commitment scheme has to be set up. Rather, they could be in the public domain (together with the factorization of p ? 1) after having been selected once and for all by an authority that does not need to be trusted. Given any i 2 Z p?1 , it is easy to compute i e ciently by a divide-and-conquer approach, but no e cient algorithm is known to invert this process (even if the factors of p?1 are known, provided they are not too small PH]), an operation known as extracting the discrete logarithm. Once the parameters p and have been agreed upon, the receiver chooses a random s 2 Z p and gives it to the originator. We assume the certi ed discrete logarithm assumption, namely that the originator is not capable of computing the discrete logarithm of s while the protocol is in progress (\certi ed" because the factors of p ? 1 are known to all parties in order that be a certi ed generator | since this could make computing the discrete logarithm easier, this assumption is stronger than the usual discrete logarithm assumption BM]).
In order to commit to bit x 2 f0; 1g, the originator selects a random r 2 Z p?1 and she computes b = r s x . She gives b to the receiver but she keeps r as her secret witness. For convenience, we shall refer to b as a blob. Subsequently, if the originator wishes to convince the receiver that b was a commitment to bit x (recall that this operation is known as opening the blob), she simply shows him the corresponding witness r. The receiver can then check that indeed b = r s x .
Because the function exp is a one-one correspondence, any element of Z p can be used by the originator as commitment to 0 just as well as to 1, depending only on which witness she knows. Moreover, all commitments give rise to blobs that are randomly and independently distributed according to the uniform distribution over Z p . Therefore, it is information-theoretically impossible for the receiver to distinguish a commitment to 0 from a commitment to 1, regardless of his computing power. On the other hand, the originator is able to open a given blob both ways if and only if she knows (or can e ciently compute) the discrete logarithm of s, which we assumed to be infeasible for her. Therefore, it seems clear that the originator cannot cheat, as argued in BCC], if indeed computing this discrete logarithm is infeasible for her. It came as a great surprise to us that this is not so and that this bit commitment scheme allows a cheating originator to get away with it in some situations. We shall discuss this issue later when we address the problem of so-called EPR{blobs (see Section ??).
Using this bit commitment scheme (with the prover as originator of all commitments), a protocol for satis ability is given in BCC]. This protocol is reviewed in Section ??. Assuming the certi ed discrete logarithm assumption, this is indeed a perfect zero-knowledge computationally convincing interactive protocol despite the weakness in the bit commitment scheme alluded to in the previous paragraph, but of course only if it is performed sequentially (as required in BCC]). Nevertheless, even the parallel version of this protocol would be perfect zero-knowledge if only the veri er (in fact the simulator, to be technically exact | see Section ??) had the key to its trap-door, a notion that we now explain.
A bit commitment scheme has the trap-door property if, in addition to the usual requirements of bit commitment schemes, there exists a secret, known as the key to the trap-door, that would allow the originator to cheat her commitments any time she wants if only she knew this key. More precisely, knowledge of this key would make it possible for her to o er fake \commitments" that she could subsequently \open" either way at her choice of the moment, and these fake commitments are information-theoretically indistinguishable from genuine ones. A moment's thought su ces to see that the bit commitment scheme based on the certi ed discrete logarithm assumption is indeed trap-door, and that its key is the discrete logarithm of s. (You may think that we will never allow the originator of commitments to know this key, but in fact it is going to be just the opposite ! )
In other words, the computationally convincing interactive protocol of BCC] remains perfect zero-knowledge even if run in parallel, provided that the veri er knows the discrete logarithm of s. But this requirement is apparently easy to ful ll because the veri er in the global protocol is the receiver of the bit commitment scheme, hence it is his prerogative to choose the parameter s. Instead of choosing it randomly in Z p , he could choose j at random in Z p?1 and compute s = j .
So are we done? Not quite because the prover would have no reason to trust the veri er to choose s in a way that he (the veri er) would know the key to the bit commitment scheme trap-door. The obvious way to solve this di culty would be to require that the veri er convince the prover that he knows the discrete logarithm of s in the initialization of Protocol 2. Naturally, this initialization would have to be achieved with a perfect zero-knowledge protocol (in which prover and veri er switch roles temporarily) since the discrete logarithm of s must remain hidden from the prover. Unfortunately, the protocols discovered several years ago for this task inherently require an unbounded number of rounds CEG, CEGP]! As mentioned at the end of Section ??, inspired by a previous version of the current paper BCY], Bellare, Micali and Ostrovsky have recently shown how to achieve constant-round perfect zero-knowledge statistically convincing interactive protocols for any random self-reducible problem, including the discrete logarithm BMO]. Using their protocol as the initialization of Protocol 2 would indeed solve our problem. Nevertheless, it would result in a more complicated protocol, requiring more rounds. In particular, the simulator (see Sections ?? and ??) would be signi cantly harder to work out.
Let us now proceed to describe our original protocol, without using subsequent ideas that were derived from it.
Our nal solution for a constant-round protocol is to use a trap-door bit commitment scheme such that the veri er cannot cheat if he knows the key for one reason, and such that he cannot cheat either if he does not know the key, but for an entirely di erent reason. Let us now sketch this idea intuitively before describing the nal protocol formally.
Forcing the veri er to commit
From now on, we assume that the trap-door bit commitment scheme based on the certi ed discrete logarithm assumption is used, as described in the previous section. All protocols start with the prover and veri er agreeing once and for all on a suitably large prime p with known factorization of p ?1, with a generator of Z p , and with the choice of some s 2 Z p by the veri er. However, we do not restrict the veri er in his way of choosing s. He can choose it randomly in Z p , he can choose its discrete logarithm at random and compute s from it, or he can follow any other (e cient) strategy.
Once all the bit commitment scheme parameters are agreed upon, either party can act as originator for commitments (recall that the prover used to be the only originator). Notice that we have slightly departed from the formal description of the discrete logarithm bit commitment scheme since we had previously said that the receiver had to choose s, whereas now it is chosen by the veri er who can also take the role of the originator. Of course, such commitments are bogus if the originator is the veri er and if he has chosen s in a way that he knows its discrete logarithm. Allowing such bogus commitments may sound crazy, but in fact this is perhaps the most crucial idea in this paper.
Why is it interesting for the veri er to originate bit commitments? As we have already discussed, the reason why Protocol 2 is not perfect zero-knowledge is that the veri er can choose his challenges y 1 ; y 2 ; . . .; y k as some complex function of x 1 ; x 2 ; . . .; x k . This is no longer possible if the veri er is forced to select his challenges before seeing the x i 's. But of course, the prover must not be allowed to know what the challenges will be when he decides which x i 's to o er to the veri er. Hence, a solution is to require the veri er to commit to his challenges before what was step 2 in Protocol 2, and to have him open his commitments afterwards. The intent is to force the challenges to be independent from the x i 's but still have the x i 's independent from the challenges. This leads to Protocol 3 below, which is almost the nal solution.
Protocol 3 ( forcing the veri er to commit ) 1: The prover and the veri er agree on p, and k 2: The veri er chooses s in Z p ; he sends s to the prover The veri er also chooses bits y 1 ; y 2 ; . . .; y k and commits to them 3: The prover commits herself by sending x 1 ; x 2 ; . . .; x k to the veri er 4: The veri er opens challenges y 1 ; y 2 ; . . .; y k for the prover 5: The prover meets the challenges by sending z 1 ; z 2 ; . . .; z k to the veri er. Now, the veri er is faced with a tough choice if he wants to squeeze information from the prover: either he chooses s in step 2 such that he knows its discrete logarithm, or he does not (in fact, there are other more exotic strategies for the veri er, and they will be taken into account later). If he does, his commitments to y 1 ; y 2 ; . . .; y k are bogus, which seems to make Protocol 3 no better than Protocol 2 since the veri er can wait to see the x i 's before having really to decide on his challenges. But that's ne because Protocol 2 is perfect zero-knowledge in the case in which the veri er knows the key to the bit commitment scheme trap-door. Conversely, if the veri er chooses s in a way that he does not know its discrete logarithm, then his commitments to y 1 ; y 2 ; . . .; y k are genuine, so that they are independent from the x i 's and the protocol is perfect zero-knowledge as well. In other words, the full title of this section should have been \Forcing the veri er to commit. . . either to his challenges or to the fact that he knows the key to the trapdoor". Either way we win! And indeed Protocol 3 is perfect zero-knowledge, as the enthusiastic reader may wish to prove.
Unfortunately, Protocol 3 still does not work for a rather subtle reason: it is no longer a computationally convincing interactive protocol because the prover can cheat without ever needing to nd the discrete logarithm of s ! Although it is true that the prover is not capable of opening any of her blobs in more than one way (assuming she does not know and cannot compute the discrete logarithm of s), it is possible for her to create blobs that she cannot open at all at the time of their creation, but that she will be able to open later. When the veri er opens his own commitments at step 4, the prover will be able to open her blobs to show bits related to those that the veri er had committed to. As a simple example, assume that the veri er commits to some challenge y in step 2 by choosing a random r 2 Z p?1 and computing e = r s y . After the veri er has given his commitment e to the prover, the prover can create a blob x by computing x = q e for a randomly chosen q 2 Z p?1 . Clearly, the prover cannot open this blob either way yet. Nevertheless, the veri er will reveal r to the prover in step 4, and this will enable the prover to \open" her blob x as bit y by showing \witness" q + r since x = q+r s y (do not forget that q and r are members of Z p?1 , hence the addition is done modulo p ? 1).
This ability of the prover to relate the value of some of her blobs to the challenges she will subsequently be issued spells doom on the protocol of BCC]. Actually, this is not a problem with Protocol 3 itself (an observation due to Sha Goldwasser). Rather, it points to the imperfection we had promised earlier about the discrete logarithm bit commitment scheme. It is not enough for a bit commitment scheme to forbid the originator from opening a blob both ways. It must also be that the originator knows already which (unique) way she can open a blob at the moment of its creation. In other words, the originator should not be allowed to \commit" to a bit that she does not yet have in mind.
In order to solve this ultimate di culty and obtain our nal constant-round perfect zero-knowledge computationally convincing interactive protocol, we must force the prover to emit only blobs that she knows how to open at the time of their creation. Let x be a blob created by the prover. We say that it is a 0{blob (resp. a 1{blob) if the prover can exhibit a z such that x = z (resp. x = z s ). As argued previously, no prover-created blob can be simultaneously a 0{blob and a 1{blob unless the prover knows (or can compute easily) the discrete logarithm of s. However, a blob can be neither a 0{blob nor a 1{blob if it was not created \according to the rules" by the prover. We call such blobs \EPR{blobs" by analogy with the way the Einstein{Podolsky{Rosen \paradox" of quantum physics AGR] allows cheating the quantum coin-tossing protocol BB1]. Again, the danger of EPR{blobs is that they could subsequently become either 0{blobs or 1{blobs when the prover obtains further information from the veri er (i.e. when the veri er opens his commitments to his challenges).
The following blob certi cation subprotocol is inspired by Benaloh's crypto-graphic capsules Be], and a similar idea was used in the perfect zero-knowledge statistically convincing interactive protocol for graph non-isomorphism due to Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson GMW]. It allows the prover to convince the veri er that a given blob is not EPR, but does not reveal anything as to whether it is a 0{blob or a 1{blob. Let x be a non-EPR{blob, which we shall call the actual blob.
Let c 2 f0; 1g be such that x is a c{blob. Let If in fact x is an EPR{blob, the only way the prover could fool the veri er in this blob certi cation subprotocol would be to guess exactly the challenges h 1 ; h 2 ; . . .; h k to come. This would allow her to prepare control blob u i \honestly" when h i = 0 but otherwise to compute u i = w i x if b i = 0 or u i = w i sx ?1 if b i = 1 for a randomly chosen w i 2 Z p?1 . If any of the h i 's had been guessed incorrectly, the prover would either be caught unable to open control blob u i (if in fact h i = 0) or unable to relate x to u i (if h i = 1). The probability of such successful guessing is 2 ?k . On the other hand, it is clear that the veri er learns nothing about c by learning either the value of b i when h i = 0 or whether or not c = b i when h i = 1.
You may have noticed that this blob certi cation subprotocol is run in parallel: the prover gives all the control blobs to the veri er, and only then does the veri er give his string of challenges to the prover. This is precisely where the infernal circle is broken. Even better, any number of instances of the blob certi cation subprotocol can take place in parallel. Consider`actual blobs for which the prover wishes to convince the veri er that none of them is EPR. For this, she can provide k control blobs for each actual blob before requesting the whole batch of` k challenges from the veri er. A formal proof that the veri er learns nothing about the prover's secret even when this process is run in parallel will be implicit when we prove in Section ?? that our nal protocol (Section ??), which uses the blob certi cation subprotocol, is perfect zero-knowledge.
The nal protocol is exactly like Protocol 3, except that the blob certi cation subprotocol is used between steps 3 and 4 for each and every blob that the prover had issued at step 3. In this way, it becomes impossible (except with probability 2 ?k ) that the information provided by the veri er at step 4 might help the prover cheat. We shall now proceed to describe the nal protocol in detail, instead of the highlevel abstraction used so far in Protocols 1{3. Before this can be done, however, a review of the basic BCC{protocol is necessary BCC]. Moreover, for the sake of selfcontainment, we also need to review the formal de nitions of perfect zero-knowledge and of computationally convincing interactive protocols.
Notation and de nitions 5.1 Interactive protocols
The notion of interactive protocol was originally formalized by Goldwasser, Micali and Racko GMR]. In this section, we review the de nitions and modify them when necessary for our purpose. An interactive protocol takes place by the exchange of messages back and forth between two parties, known as the prover and the veri er. The purpose of the protocol is for the prover to convince the veri er of the validity of a statement such as \Boolean expression is satis able" or \graphs G and H are not isomorphic", or \I know the factorization of large integer n".
The protocol's speci cation prescribes the behaviour of the \honest" parties, but sometimes we must deal also with parties that deviate arbitrarily from their prescribed behaviour. Such dishonest parties are called cheaters. It is convenient to think of the prover and veri er (honest or cheating) as probabilistic algorithms. These algorithms take turns at being active. One of them is active initially. Whenever it wishes, the active party can terminate the entire protocol, or activate the other party before going to sleep. When the latter situation occurs, the activating party usually passes a message to the activated party. Normally, it is the veri er that decides to terminate the protocol, in which case he also chooses whether to accept or reject.
In the original de nition of interactive protocols by Goldwasser, Micali and Racko GMR], the veri er (honest or cheating) is restricted to being probabilistic polynomial time. In the context of perfect zero-knowledge (Section ??), which concerns us in this paper, we believe that this is unnecessarily restrictive. Hence, we impose no computational restrictions on cheating veri ers. Nevertheless, we ask that the honest veri er be e cient since otherwise the protocol would be of no practical value. On the other hand, the prover of GMR] is assumed to have unlimited computing power. We cannot accommodate such powerful provers in the context of computationally convincing interactive protocols (see below). However, we do not require speci cally that the prover be probabilistic polynomial time because this would be an asymptotic restriction, which may be totally irrelevant in real-life instances. Rather, we make the assumption that there is a speci c instance of a computational task that the prover cannot perform while the protocol is in progress. More details are given below.
To any given run of an interactive protocol, there corresponds a con dence parameter k, agreed upon between the prover and the veri er. It must be the case that the expected time to carry out the protocol between the honest parties grows at worst linearly with the value of k. The interactive protocol is statistically complete if, whenever the prover is honest, the probability that the honest veri er will terminate and accept is at least 1 ? 2 ?k . It is perfectly (or unconditionally) complete if this probability is exactly 1, as is the case for most interactive protocols in the literature, including our own given in Section ??. Notice that we do not require that a dishonest veri er must accept with high probability when the prover is honest, because of course a very stubborn cheating veri er could reject no matter what happens.
Let us now consider an arbitrary dishonest prover, who is trying to convince the veri er of a false statement. Of course, such a cheating prover is not required to follow her prescribed share of the protocol; she can do whatever she wants in her attempts to fool the veri er. Let us nevertheless assume the existence of a speci c computational task that the prover cannot perform, except with negligible probability }, during the time necessary to carry out the interactive protocol. The protocol is computationally convincing (with respect to that assumption) if the probability that the honest veri er, when interacting with this cheating prover, will accept the prover's claim is at most } + 2 ?k . In other words, the only way the cheating prover can succeed is either by being exponentially lucky (with probability 2 ?k ), or by successfully carrying out (with probability }) the computational task that we assumed her incapable of doing.
It should be emphasized that the computational limitation imposed on the prover is concrete, rather than being asymptotic as if we had simply requested her to be a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm. Even if P = NP, it may still be infeasible for the prover to extract a large enough discrete logarithm while the interactive protocol is in progress (except with negligible probability).
Let us nally remark that most published work that deal with interactive protocols do not have this con dence parameter k. Rather, they insist that the probability of successful cheating should be bounded by a function of the size of the prover's claim. We feel that this is inadequate because there is no direct link between the importance for the veri er of not being fooled and the size of the statement under consideration (except perhaps that if the statement is short enough, the veri er might be able to handle it without help from the prover). Moreover, using k larger than, say, 300 is a ridiculous waste of time, whereas instances of size larger than 300 could be reasonable in practice.
Perfect zero-knowledge
The notion of (computational) zero-knowledge was also introduced by Goldwasser, Micali and Racko GMR]. In this paper, we only deal with the simpler and stronger notion of perfect zero-knowledge, which was introduced by Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson GMW].
Consider an interactive protocol between the prover and the veri er. Assume that the prover is honest, but let us consider a cheating veri er that can deviate arbitrarily from his prescribed behaviour. (In the context of GMW], the veri er is restricted to being probabilistic polynomial time; we do not impose any such restrictions here.) Intuitively, the protocol is perfect zero-knowledge if, despite his potentially nasty behaviour, the veri er does not learn anything about the prover's secret, except of course that the prover's claim is valid.
In order to formalize this notion, we must introduce the concepts of the veri er's view and of the simulator GMR]. The view of the veri er, when interacting with the honest prover, is de ned as what he gets to see while the protocol is in progress, namely his own random coin ips and the messages sent to him by the prover. Of course, this view is a random variable, which depends on the veri er's and the prover's coin ips. The honest prover together with an arbitrary veri er de ne a probability distribution on the veri er's possible views.
We say that this view can be simulated if there is another probabilistic algorithm, known as the simulator, that can output views with exactly the same probability distribution without ever talking to the prover, under the sole assumption that the prover is honest. Contrary to Goldwasser, Micali and Racko , we insist that this simulator should not depend on the veri er under consideration, but we allow it access to and complete control over the veri er. By \complete control", we mean that the simulator can run the veri er, making him believe that he is interacting with the prover. At any time during this interaction, the simulator can take snapshots of the veri er or restore him to a previous state. Moreover, the simulator is given control over the coin ips of the veri er.
It is clear that the veri er does not learn anything from the prover that the simulator (who never even communicates with the prover) could not tell him. Therefore, if the simulator is e cient, the prover does not disclose anything to the veri er that he could not have computed by himself. But what do we mean by an \e cient simulator" considering that we had not restricted the veri er to being e cient? The simulator is e cient if the expected time it requires to output its simulated view is at most a (small) constant factor of the expected time that the real protocol between the honest prover and the veri er under consideration would have taken. In other words, the simulator is allowed to restore the veri er and run it a few times with di erent partial views, but the expected number of such reruns should be small. Finally, we say that an interactive protocol is perfect zero-knowledge if such an e cient simulator exists.
An abstract description of the basic BCC{protocol
Our constant-round perfect zero-knowledge computationally convincing interactive protocol for satis ability is inspired from a speci c protocol introduced in BCC]. Describing this basic BCC{protocol in detail would take up too much space, but an abstract description of how it proceeds is su cient to understand the new techniques and ideas. We suggest that you read this subsection even if you are familiar with BCC], because it introduces new notation.
When we write f : X ! Y , it means not only that f is a function from X to Y , but that this function can be computed e ciently. As an abuse of notation, f will also serve to denote an e cient algorithm for this computation. When we write f : X R ?! Y , it means that f is an e cient probabilistic algorithm that associates to each x 2 X a probability distribution f(x) over Y . When no confusion can arise, we also use f(x) to denote the probabilistic result of applying algorithm f to input x.
Let denote f0; 1g and ? denote f0; 1; 2g. Given any set X, the set of nite For any integer n, let F n denote the set of Boolean expressions on n variables and let A n denote ftrue; falseg n , the set of truth assignments to n variables. Let F and A denote the in nite union of the F n 's and A n 's, respectively. To each 2 F is associated in BCC] a nite set C ? of \scrambled circuits" (it is not important to understand the \meaning" of the elements of C , but if you are familiar with BCC], think of them as the bits appearing in a \Figure 3" BCC, page 162] in some predetermined order). Similarly, to each 2 F corresponds a nite set D ? ? of \partially opened circuits" (again, if you are familiar with BCC], think of the bits of a \Figure 4" in some predetermined order, with unopened blobs represented by 2). Given any 2 F andc 2 ? , it is e ciently decidable whether or not c 2 C . Similarly, given any 2 F andd 2 ? ? , it is e ciently decidable whether or notd 2 D . Moreover, for any given 2 F, all the elements of C and D are of the same length, which is denoted by`( ).
The key property that makes the basic BCC{protocol work is that, for any is a satisfying assignment for , hence is satis able and furthermore the prover knows or can e ciently compute a satisfying assignment for it. On the other hand, ifc i = 2 C ord i = 2 D , there is at least a 50% probability that the veri er will catch the prover cheating in this round. The probability of undetected cheating is thus 2 ?k for the entire protocol, still assuming that the prover cannot cheat the bit commitment scheme. On the other hand, this protocol is perfect zero-knowledge provided that the commitments to 0 are information-theoretically indistinguishable from commitments to 1 (which they are if we use the bit commitment scheme described earlier). In order to simulate one round of the protocol, the simulator ips a coin. If it comes up heads, the simulator generatesc = ( ), commits to each bit inc, and asks the veri er for his challenge. If the challenge is 0, the simulator opens all the blobs; otherwise, it forgets about this unlucky event and tries again. If the coin comes up tails, the simulator generatesd = ( ), setsc = }(d ), commits to each bit inc, and asks the veri er for his challenge. If the challenge is 1, the simulator opens the blobs corresponding to d j] 6 = 2; otherwise, it forgets about this unlucky event and tries again. Because commitments to 0 and commitments to 1 are indistinguishable, the veri er's challenge is independent from the simulator's coin ip. Hence, the expected number of trials for the successful simulation of one round is 2. Therefore, the simulation is perfect and all k rounds can be simulated one after the other in about twice the time it would take to carry out the real protocol.
are possible for all statements in NP.
Recall Let be a satis able Boolean expression. Assume the prover knows a satisfying assignmentã for . The following protocol is carried out. To avoid cluttering the protocol with trivial details, some obvious but necessary tests are not explicitly shown. For instance, the prover should make sure at step P1 that s 2 Z p , because otherwise the veri er would immediately obtain her secret if the prover were stupid enough to proceed with the protocol when s = 0.
Protocol 4 ( the nal constant-round protocol )
: (Initialization.) The prover and veri er agree on a large prime p such that the factorization of p ? 1 is known, a generator of Z p , and a con dence parameter k. This step does not count towards the number of rounds because it can be done ahead of time and because p and could even be in the public domain (chosen once and for all by an authority that needs not be trusted). 7 The protocol is computationally convincing
It is obvious that Protocol 4 is perfectly complete. Let us now argue that it is computationally convincing. Assume that the prover attempts running her share of Protocol 4 on a Boolean formula that is not satis able. Assume furthermore that she is not capable, while the protocol is in progress, to gure out the discrete logarithm of s, as given to her by the veri er at step V1. In this case, we claim that the probability that her cheating will go undetected is at best 2 ?k if she interacts with the honest veri er prescribed by Protocol 4.
In order to see this, notice rst that her behaviour in step P1 cannot depend on the veri er's challenge vectorỹ since the vector of commitmentsẽ is informationtheoretically uncorrelated to the challenges.
In step P1, the prover can either output at least one EPR{blob x i j], or all of thẽ x i 's are composed only of non-EPR{blobs. In the rst case, as argued in Section ??, the probability that this will not be detected by the veri er at step V3 is 2 ?k at best. In the second case, there can exist at most one challenge vectorỹ for which the prover can satisfy the veri er at step V4. This is because if there is an i such that the prover can satisfy the veri er both if y i = 0 (by givingc i ) and if y i = 1 (by givingd i ), thenc i andd i would have to be compatible by assumption that the prover cannot change her commitments and because they are not EPR. But then ( ;c;d ) is a satisfying assignment for , which contradicts the assumption that is not satis able. Therefore, the probability that the challenge vector opened by the veri er at step V3 is precisely the one that the prover was able to cope with, is at most 2 ?k as well.
Actually, a stronger result can be stated: even if is satis able, the prover will be caught cheating with probability at least 1 ? 2 ?k unless she actually knows a satisfying assignment for (or can compute one while the protocol is in progress), or unless she can extract the discrete logarithm of s. Therefore, this protocol constitutes a computationally convincing proof of knowledge. This issue will be discussed at greater length in a subsequent paper.
The protocol is perfect zero-knowledge
The main theorem of this paper is that the constant-round protocol of Section ??
is perfect zero-knowledge. In order to establish this, we must exhibit a simulator, and prove that it is e cient and that it produces views with exactly the correct distribution. First of all, let us see the simulator.
The simulator
In order to simulate perfectly and e ciently the conversation that the real prover would have with any veri er, we must take account of a wide range of possible behaviours for the veri er. For instance, the simulator must succeed when 1. the veri er chooses s at step V1 in a way that he knows its discrete logarithm, which allows him to give bogus commitments also at step V1 and thus postpone his choice of challenges until step V3; or 2. the veri er chooses s at step V1 such that it does not know its discrete logarithm; or 3. more subtlely, when the veri er chooses s in a way that it does not yet know its discrete logarithm at step V1, but in some cases manages to gure it out before reaching step V3, perhaps using information provided by the prover in steps P1 and P2 (of course, such information could only help the veri er by sheer luck since the prover does not know the discrete logarithm of s; nevertheless, such luck is possible and must be taken into account); or 4. the veri er decides at some point to \misbehave", that is to refuse to cooperate in a way that would cause the prover to terminate prematurely the protocol (this happens for instance if the veri er supplies s = 0 at step V1, if he claims at step V3 that the prover has cheated with the control blobs when in fact this is not the case, or if he supplies \2" as one of his challenge y i ).
In the rst case, the veri er's challenges could depend on the prover's input at steps P1 and P2. If this happens, the simulator will use its resetting capability to force the veri er to disclose the discrete logarithm of s. Once the simulator knows this information, it can \cheat" when it simulates step P3 since this gives it the key to the bit commitment scheme trap-door.
In the second case, the simulator can run the veri er once in order to obtain his challenges at step V3, rewind the veri er, and resimulate step P1 with commitments that it can open to meet the same challenges.
The third and fourth cases are more di cult and will be dealt with by the simulator formally described below. In particular, the fourth case is initially dealt with when we prescribe that the simulator should \output the veri er's view so far (including the random tape) and stop when the veri er refuses to behave properly".
In order to describe the simulator, it is more convenient to think of the veri er as if it were a deterministic process having access to a read-only one-way purely random tape. This random tape is put under the control of the simulator. Initially, this tape is empty. Whenever the veri er wishes to access a new bit on his random tape, the simulator ips a fair coin, places the resulting random bit on the tape, and allows the veri er to proceed. At any time it wishes, the simulator can take a snapshot of the veri er and later restore the veri er in the exact state it had then. When the veri er is reset to a previous state, his read-only head on the random tape is reset to where it was in that state, but the other random bits that the simulator may have ipped remain there, possibly to be read again by the veri er. Hence, the veri er reuses the same source of random bits after resetting. The advantage of this approach instead of having the simulator prepare the random tape once and for all ahead of time is that it allows to deal with veri ers that do not have an a priori time limit. This is important if we want the simulator to work with any veri er whatsoever. Moreover, it is crucial even if we only consider probabilistic veri ers that run in expected polynomial time but that could take signi cantly more time with small probability.
We now proceed to describe the simulator. When we mention step 0, step Vi or step Pi, we refer to the corresponding steps in Protocol 4. You will notice that the simulation follows exactly Protocol 4 up to and including step S6 (with the simulator in the role of the prover).
Protocol 5 ( the simulator ) S: The simulator carries out the initialization step 0 with the veri er exactly as the prover would. If the veri er refuses to behave properly, the simulator outputs the veri er's view so far (including the random tape) and stops. S1: The simulator waits for the veri er to supply s andẽ as expected in step V1. If the veri er refuses to behave properly, the simulator outputs the veri er's view so far and stops. Otherwise, the simulator takes a snapshot of the veri er.
S2: The simulator proceeds exactly as the prover would in step P1; in particular, it sends thex i 's andũ ij 's to the veri er. S11: The simulator waits for the veri er to supplyr andỹ as expected in step V3. It is possible that this response from the veri er will be di erent from what he had given previously at step S5. If the veri er refuses to behave properly, the simulator goes back to step S7.
. . . continued on next page . . .
Protocol 5 (continued) S12: The simulator checks that '(ẽ;r;ỹ ) . If this fails, the simulator goes back to step S7.
S13: There are two possibilities at this point: eitherỹ =ŷ or not. In the rst case, the simulator had prepared its commitments so that it can meet the challenges. In the second case, this means that the veri er has changed his challenges, which allows the simulator to compute the discrete logarithm of s. Ifỹ =ŷ, go to step S15; otherwise, continue. S14: (The veri er has changed his challenges between steps S5 and S11.) Consider any i, 1 i k, such that y i 6 =ŷ i . , it is clear that a = s, hence the simulator has obtained the discrete logarithm of s. For each i such that y i = 0 andŷ i = 1, the simulator computes c i = ( ), and for each i such that y i = 1 andŷ i = 0, the simulator computesd i = ( ). Now, for each i such that y i 6 =ŷ i , the simulator changes the z i j]'s chosen in step S8 when necessary, as explained below. This will allow the simulator to opens the \commitments" contained iñ x i in a way that will satisfy challenge y i even thoughx i was originally prepared in order to satisfy challengeŷ i . This is done as follows. For each i such that y i 6 =ŷ i and for each j such that c i j] 6 = }(d i j]), { ifŷ i = c i j], the value of z i j] is decremented by a; { ifŷ i 6 = c i j], the value of z i j] is incremented by a. S15: (The simulator is now ready to output the veri er's view.) The simulator outputs the veri er's random tape, thex i 's and theũ ij 's from step S8, and thew ij 's and thet ij 's from step S10. Moreover, For each i such that y i] = 0, the simulator outputsz i andc i ; for each i such that y i] = 1, the simulator resets z i j] to 0 when d i j] = 2, and it outputs z i andd i . The simulator halts.
The simulator produces the correct distribution
Let be a satis able boolean expression. Letã be a satisfying assignment for known by the honest prover. Let`denote`( ), the length of each member of C and D . Consider any veri er. Consider also an in nite string R of random bits.
From now on, consider ,ã,`, R, and the veri er as xed. Hence, when we say that \A is determined uniquely by B", we mean \by B and these xed parameters".
Let us analyse the view of the veri er supplied with R on his random tape when interacting with the honest prover prescribed by Protocol 4, and compare it with the view produced by the simulator when it supplies the appropriate initial segment of the same R to the veri er on his random tape. For simplicity, let us assume that the veri er does not misbehave so early that step P1 is not even entered; otherwise, it is obvious that the simulation is perfect. For simplicity, we shall also pretend that step 0 in Protocol 4 and step S0 in Protocol 5 do not exist, because it is clear that step S0 simulates exactly step 0. Now that we have excluded step 0 from consideration, observe that the veri er's s andẽ supplied at step V1 are determined by the xed parameters, and thus may as well be considered xed too. Observe also that the only step of Protocol 4 in which the prover makes random choices is step P1. Hence, everything in Protocol 4 is determined entirely by the prover's choices of thec i 's,z i 's,b ij 's, andṽ ij 's. (Thẽ x i 's andũ ij 's are determined from these random choices.)
More to the point, the veri er's view of Protocol 4 until just before step P3, when interacting with the prover, is determined entirely by thex i 's,ũ ij 's, andt ij 's supplied by the prover at steps P1 and P2 (unless step P2 does not take place, in which case the veri er's view is determined by thex i 's andũ ij 's alone). This is true because thew ij 's supplied by the honest prover at step P2 (assuming it takes place) are determined uniquely by thex i 's,ũ ij 's,t ij 's, and by theh ij 's supplied by the veri er at step V2, but theh ij 's themselves are determined uniquely by thex i 's and theũ ij 's. To see this, notice that the tests performed by the honest veri er at step V3 give no freedom for thew ij 's that will not cause him to reject, because the discrete logarithm is uniquely de ned.
A crucial observation is that the prover's protocol results in eachx i j],ũ ij m] andt ij m] being produced randomly and independently according to the uniform distribution over Z p , Z p , and f0; 1g, respectively (except that thet ij 's are not produced when step P2 is not entered). Let denote the space of possible values for the collection ofx i 's,ũ ij 's, andt ij 's. More precisely, = (Z p (Z p f0; 1g) k )`k. Consider any element 2 . We say that is good if Protocol 4 reaches step V4 when the veri er is supplied the view consistent with at steps P1 and P2. Otherwise, is bad. (\Consistent" means that thew ij 's take the unique values that would not cause the honest veri er to reject at step V3.) Finally, let } denote the number of good elements in divided by the total number of elements in . In simple terms, } stands for the probability that the veri er does not misbehave in Protocol 4, the probability being taken over the random choices of the prover (we do not care if the veri er misbehaves in step V4 by rejecting when he should not, because this decision is not part of his view). Of course, } may be a function of the random tape R, but this does not concern us here since R is xed.
The interaction of the veri er with the honest prover in Protocol 4 is characterized as follows. The prover chooses thec i 's,z i 's,b ij 's, andṽ ij 's randomly at step P1. This determines thex i 's andũ ij 's. If the veri er misbehaves at step V2, consider random binary values for thet ij 's; otherwise, the prover'sx i 's andũ ij 's determine the veri er'sh ij 's, which in turn determine the prover'st ij 's at step P2. Let stand for the collection ofx i 's,w ij 's, andt ij 's thus produced. Once again, is uniformly distributed over by the prover's random choices at step P1.
If is good, which happens with probability }, it determines the veri er's challenge vectorỹ at step V3. At step P3, the prover shows the veri erc i 's in C when y i = 0 and andd i 's in D when y i = 1, together with the appropriatez i 's. Even though thec i 's andd i 's were determined as early as step P1, they are completely uncorrelated with because blobs are uncorrelated with the bits they hide. Moreover, thec i 's are uniformly distributed over C (because they are produced by a call on ( ) at step P1), and thed i 's are uniformly distributed over D (because they are produced as ( ; ( );ã) in steps P1 and P3). Quite the opposite, thez i 's are determined completely by , thec i 's (when h i = 0) and thed i 's (when h i = 1).
In conclusion, the veri er's view of Protocol 4 is uniquely determined by a random uniformly distributed over and, if is good, by a collection of random c i 's andd i 's uniformly distributed over C and D , respectively.
Let us now consider the view produced by the simulator in Protocol 5 when it supplies the veri er with the appropriate initial segment of the same random tape R. Clearly, Protocol 5 mimics exactly Protocol 4 until (and if) it reaches step S7. Therefore, with probability 1?}, the simulation never reaches step S7 and it outputs the view of a veri er that misbehaves. This view is produced according to the same probability distribution than if the veri er had interacted with the prover. Moreover, this view is consistent with a 2 that is not good, and this is obtained according to the uniform distribution over the bad elements of (assuming that } 6 = 1).
On the other hand, the simulation reaches step S7 with probability }. This happens if and only if the view of the veri er so far is consistent with a good 2 , in which case this is distributed uniformly over the good elements in . Each attempt to go from step S7 to step S13 can be thought of as sampling within uniformly in the hope of hitting a good element again. Clearly, whenever such a good element is reached, it is obtained according to the uniform distribution over the good elements of .
From there, step S15 will producec i 's in C when the veri er's challenge y i is 0 andd i 's in D when y i is 1, together with the uniquez i 's consistent with thex i 's in . Regardless of whether thesec i 's andd i 's were chosen at step S8 or S14, they are uniformly distributed over C (by a call on ( )) and D (by a call on ( )) in a way that is uncorrelated with .
To summarize, the view produced by the simulator is consistent with a random uniformly distributed over the bad elements of with probability 1 ? }, or with a random uniformly distributed over the good elements of with probability }. This is just a complicated way of saying that the view produced by the simulator is consistent with a random uniformly distributed over all the elements of . Moreover, if is good, this view includes randomc i 's andd i 's (as required by the h i 's consistent with ) uniformly distributed over C and D , together with the appropriatez i 's. In other words, the view produced by the simulator is distributed exactly as the veri er's view when interacting with the honest prover. The two key properties of the basic BCC{protocol that make all this work are that both ( ) and ( ; ( );ã) produce elements of D according to the same probability distribution, and that blobs are information-theoretically uncorrelated with the bits they hide. This concludes the proof that the simulation is perfect.
The simulator is e cient
Let } and be as in Section ??, as well as all the xed parameters. Clearly, } is exactly the probability that the simulator reaches step S7 in Protocol 5 because until then Protocol 5 mimics precisely Protocol 4. More interestingly, } is also exactly the probability that the simulator, if in step S7, can reach step S13 (and hence terminate happily at step S15) without going back at least once to step S7. In order to see this, observe again that the collection ofx i 's,ũ ij 's, andt ij 's obtained in steps S8 and S10 is produced randomly according to the uniform distribution over .
Consequently, a simple calculation shows that the expected number of times that step S7 is entered is exactly 1 (unless } = 0, in which case this number is 0). But it is clear that steps S0 to S6 cannot be entered more than once each, and that none of the steps after S7 can be entered more times than step S7 itself. Therefore, the expected time for the simulator's protocol is no more than the expected time for executing once each of its steps, which is e cient with respect to the veri er's e ciency.
This completes the proof that Protocol 4 is perfect zero-knowledge.
9 One-way certi ed group actions Our nal protocol, as given in Section ?? is computationally convincing under the certi ed discrete logarithm assumption (Section ??). Clearly, a weaker assumption is su cient to make it work: all we need is a trap-door bit commitment scheme unconditionally secure for the originator, such that EPR{blobs can be detected except possibly with exponentially small probability. It would be very nice if such bit commitment schemes could be designed under the sole assumption that one-way functions exist. Although we are not able to do this, we now proceed to show that it is su cient to assume the existence of one-way certi ed group actions, which is a new notion introduced in this paper. This is a generalization of the one-way group homomorphism introduced in IY] and used in a previous version of the current paper BCY].
De nitions
First of all, let us recall what a group action is. Let G be a nite group whose operation is simply denoted by juxtaposition and let " denote the identity element of G. Let S be any nite set. We say that G acts on S if each element of G induces a permutation of S such that the permutation induced by gh is the composition of the permutations induced by g and by h, where g and h are any elements of G.
More formally, we have a function T : G ! (S ! S) such that (1) (8g 2 G)(8h 2 G)(8s 2 S) (T(gh))(s) = (T(g))((T(h))(s))], and (2) (8g 2 G)(8t 2 S)(9!s 2 S) (T(g))(s) = t]. (It is an easy exercise to show that this unique s is (T (g ?1 ) )(t).) Given condition (1), it is elementary to prove that condition (2) is equivalent to saying that the function induced by the group identity element is the identity function. In other words, G act on S through T if and only if conditions (1) above and (3) below are satis ed.
(3) (8s 2 S) (T("))(s) = s].
To avoid cluttering the text with parentheses, it is customary to denote (T(g))(s) simply by gs. Therefore, condition (1) can be restated simply as (gh)s = g(hs).
(Despite the appearance of this formula, it does not really have anything to do with associativity!)
Let us now suppose that G acts on S. Let s 0 be a xed element of S. The group action is s 0 {one-way if Membership in G and S can be tested e ciently.
It is feasible to draw randomly within G with uniform distribution. By g 2 R G, we mean that g is chosen randomly within G with uniform distribution.
The group operation, the group inversion, and the group action can be computed e ciently. In other words, given any g 2 G, h 2 G and s 2 S, it is easy to compute gh, g ?1 , and gs.
Consider g 2 R G and let t = gs 0 . Given s 0 and t, it is infeasible to compute anŷ g such thatĝs 0 = t, except with negligible probability, where the probability is taken over all choices of g and possibly over the random choices taken by the e cient algorithm trying to defeat this property. Note that the problem is not to ndĝ 6 = g.
A group action is one-way if it is feasible to nd an s 0 2 S such that the group action is s 0 {one-way. Such an s 0 will be referred to as the source of the action.
Given any s 2 S, let Q(s) denote ft 2 S j (9g 2 G) t = gs]g. A one-way group action whose source is s 0 is certi ed if Given any t 2 S, it is easy to decide whether or not t 2 Q(s 0 ). Of course, the easy thing is to decide on the existence of a g 2 G such that t = gs 0 , not to actually discover any such g.
A one-way group action whose source is s 0 is statistically certi ed if Given any t 2 S, it is easy to \decide" whether or not t 2 Q(s 0 ), with an arbitrarily small error probability. As a slight relaxation of this notion, we allow the party who wishes to verify that t 2 Q(s 0 ) to seek help from another party who may know a g 2 G such that t = gs 0 . This other party, however, should not help the initial party to nd any such g and it should not require an unbounded number of rounds.
Commitments with group actions
Let G be a group and S be a set, and consider a one-way certi ed group action.
In order to set up a bit commitment scheme, the receiver chooses a source s 0 for the action and a g 0 2 R G. He computes s 1 = g 0 s 0 and he gives s 0 and s 1 to the originator. The originator checks that s 0 2 S, s 1 2 S, and s 1 2 Q(s 0 ). In order to commit to bit x 2 f0; 1g, the originator chooses g 2 R G and computes b = gs x . She keeps g as her witness to the e ect that b is an x{blob.
In order to open a commitment b as bit x, the originator shows the corresponding witness g. The receiver checks that b = gs x .
Notice that 0{blobs are produced by computing gs 0 whereas 1-blobs are produced by computing gs 1 = g(g 0 s 0 ) = (gg 0 )s 0 , where g 2 R G. Therefore, such commitments are information-theoretically secure for the originator because the effect of computing gg 0 for a xed g 0 2 G and a g chosen randomly with uniform distribution within G is in fact to choose randomly an element of G with uniform distribution. In other words, nothing distinguishes a 0{blob from a 1{blob, except for the witness known by the originator alone. The condition that the one-way group action should be certi ed is crucial here: if the receiver were able to get away with giving the originator some s 1 = bit, unless both blobs are EPR. We also leave it for the reader to verify that no information about which way both these blobs can be opened leaks when the originator gives h to the receiver. (The reason why control blobs cannot be implemented directly with one-way certi ed group actions is that they do not provide a natural mechanism by which the originator can convince the receiver that he can open blobs b 1 and b 2 to show di erent bits, assuming they are not EPR.)
Bit commitment schemes based on one-way statistically certi ed one-way group actions can also be used in the constant-round protocol of in Section ??, but the resulting computationally convincing protocol will merely be statistically zeroknowledge rather than perfect zero-knowledge GMW].
9.4 Examples of one-way certi ed group actions 9.4.1 Back to the discrete logarithm
Assuming the certi ed discrete logarithm assumption, a one-way certi ed group action can be built as follows. Let p be a prime for which the factorization of p ? 1 is known and let be a generator for Z p . Let G be Z p?1 , let S be Z p , and let s 0 be 1. Given g 2 G and s 2 S, the group action is de ned as gs = s g . It is easy to see that all the requirements for a one-way certi ed group action are satis ed. In this case, the one-wayness of the group action follows directly from the certi ed discrete logarithm assumption and the one-way group action is certi ed because recognizing elements of Q(s 0 ) is trivial since S = Q(s 0 ) follows from the fact that is a certi ed generator.
One-way group homomorphisms
Consider any one-way group homomorphism h : X ! Y (see BCY, Section 5] for a de nition) such that membership in X and Y can be tested e ciently (an important condition forgotten in BCY]). Let G be X, S be Y , and s 0 be the identity element of Y . Given g 2 G and s 2 S, the group action is de ned as gs = s h(g). Details that this de nes a one-way certi ed group action are left for the reader.
Scheme based on graph isomorphism
The notion of one-way group homomorphisms described in BCY] provided a generalization of the bit commitment scheme based on the certi ed discrete logarithm assumption, but it was probably not as general as one-way certi ed group actions. Although we do not know any one-way certi ed group action that could not be recast in the context of one-way group homomorphisms, we now describe a one-way statistically certi ed group action that does not correspond to a one-way group homomorphism. The one-wayness of our group action depends on an unproved assumption introduced in BC2]. Let n be a xed large integer. Let G be the group of permutations of X n = f1; 2; . . .; ng under composition (where (gh)(i) = h(g(i))). Let S be the set of all graphs with X n as vertex set. Let us assume the existence of a hard graph in the sense of BC2]: a graph is hard if it is infeasible to gure out an isomorphism between it and a random isomorphic copy of it, except with negligible probability.
Let s 0 2 S be such a hard graph. Given g 2 G and s = (X n ; E) 2 S, the group action is de ned as gs = (X n ;Ê), where (u; v) 2Ê if and only if (g(u); g(v)) 2 E.
This group action is one-way by assumption and it is statistically certi ed because of the protocol given in BMO]. Intuitively, the reason why this group action cannot be recast as a group homomorphism is that there is no natural group operation that one could put on S.
